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Abstract. 
Over the last fifteen years profound changes have taken place within the policy and 
institutional context of strategic planning for waste management in the United Kingdom. 
In addition to the significant influence of the sustainability discourse on policy innovation 
and the reconfiguration of institutional arrangements and policy networks, there has 
been growing political and public interest, and tensions, in the regionalisation of waste 
management, as represented by the establishment of the Regional Technical Advisory 
Bodies (RTABs) for waste. Drawing on concepts developed within urban regime theory 
and debates on institutional capacity-building, this paper argues that if RTABs are to be 
seen as a new form of governance for waste planning the development of their capacity 
to meet the challenge of ‘collective action’ depends on the quality of their governance 
relations and in particular on the existence and amplification of four forms of capital: 
intellectual, social, material and political. The first stage of our research, which by the 
time of writing (April 2004) included around 60 semi-structured interviews with RTAB 
members throughout the English regions, has identified a number of potential barriers 
and enablers that affect the ability of RTABs to develop such a capacity. In conclusion, 
the paper provides an overall assessment of RTABs and draws a tentative picture of their 
possible future. 
 
Introduction 
Over the last fifteen years profound changes have taken place in the context for 
strategic waste planning in the UK, including growing political and public interest and 
tensions in sub-national waste management and the reconfiguration of institutional 
arrangements and policy networks. Drawing on the preliminary findings of an ongoing 
research project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), this paper 
aims to examine the dynamics of these changes in the context of current debate about 
transformation of the ‘traditional’ forms of government, understood as the formal 
organisations and procedures of the public sector, into governance, understood as the 
multiplicity of governmental and non-governmental organisations, involved in mobilising 
and managing collective action. 
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Within the context of strategic waste planning, this transformation has led to the 
introduction of Regional Technical Advisory Bodies (RTABs) whose membership goes 
beyond representatives from the public sector. Alongside the wider emphasis within the 
planning system on a place-based integrated approach to waste policies and in the 
context of mounting pressures to move away from landfill towards more sustainable 
waste management options, the RTABs appear to have much to offer in transcending 
institutional fragmentation, fostering a collaborative strategic approach and developing 
new ways of thinking about waste planning. However, the initial findings of the research 
are pointing to a number of situational constraints that are likely to limit the governance 
capacity of the RTABs to meet their potential. 
The paper is organised under six main parts. The first part is a brief overview of the 
changes that have taken place in the institutional architecture and policy discourses of 
waste management in the UK since the late 1980s. The second part contextualises these 
changes by drawing on the debate about the wider processes and outcomes of the 
transition from government to governance. The third part focuses on a more detailed 
account of the formation and role of RTABs in England. Emphasis will be placed on 
examining the extent to which RTABs as a new form of institutional arrangement for 
strategic waste planning are capable of meeting the challenge of collective action. In the 
fourth part of the paper we will outline a conceptual framework that combines some of 
the concepts developed by urban regime theory with those arising from the debates on 
institutional capacity building. According to these, the key to the development of a 
sustained capacity to meet the challenge of collective action is the quality of governance 
relations and in particular the availability of four forms of capital: intellectual, social, 
material and political. In the fifth part of the paper, we will examine some of the key 
barriers to and opportunities for the development of these capitals within RTABs’ 
relations. We draw on the outcome of the first stage of the research in which qualitative 
information was collected through extensive documentary analyses and around 60 semi-
structured interviews with members of RTABs across the English regions. However, it 
should be noted that the first stage of the research was undertaken at a time when both 
the policy context and the institutional landscape for management of waste were in a 
state of flux. The roles, powers and responsibilities of RTABs were still evolving and a 
degree of uncertainty surrounded their future role. Given such a dynamic process and 
the mid-term status of our research, it was premature to arrive at definitive conclusions. 
Instead, in the sixth and concluding part to the paper we have made some informed 
speculations about the future of RTABs and their potential capacity for governing the 
strategic waste planning process.  
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1. The changing policy and institutional context of waste management 
There are not many other public policy areas in the UK that have been subject to the 
same level of changes that have confronted the regulation, planning and management of 
waste in the last 15 years. It can be argued that such a high level of policy development 
in such a short period of time is an attempt to make up for decades of policy neglect and 
vacuum and to catch up with the standards that are practiced elsewhere in the EU. For 
more than 20 years, since the mid-1970s, waste management was regarded primarily as 
waste disposal with landfill serving as the dominant disposal option (Gandy, 1994). 
Landfill not only provided a relatively cheap option, it was also perceived as a useful way 
of ‘filling holes in the ground’ left behind after extensive mineral extractions. Inevitably, 
the location of quarries often dictated the location of landfill sites (Davoudi, 1999). 
Hence, the dominance of economic imperatives, locational convenience and 
environmental neglect meant that by 1995 the vast majority of waste, including 90% of 
household waste, was disposed of to landfill (DoE, 1995).  
In the 1990s, however, induced by new EU regulatory standards and an emphasis on 
sustainable waste management, a decisive shift in the policy agendas and discourses of 
waste management began to make its mark. This was captured by a move away from 
total reliance on landfill towards the adoption of a ‘waste hierarchy’. This promoted 
waste reduction, reuse and recovery of material and energy from waste as the preferred 
options and considered disposal as a last resort (DoE, 1995). The waste hierarchy was 
complemented by two new interconnected concepts of regional ‘self-sufficiency’ and the 
‘proximity principle’ in order to encourage the management of waste as close to the 
place of its production as possible. The need to reduce landfill was given an added 
impetus by the EU Landfill Directive in 1999 (EC, 1999). This demands a substantial 
reduction in biodegradable municipal waste sent to landfill. Meeting the Directive’s 
targets as well as the ones set by the national Waste Strategy (DETR, 2000) for 
recycling and composting at a time when the annual production of household waste is 
growing by three percent requires a large number of new facilities across the country.  
However, the growing level of public opposition to the siting of these facilities has 
made the decision-making processes highly political and contentious, leading to 
substantial delays and often refusal of the planning applications for new developments. 
It was the increasing realisation of the scale of the challenge that prompted the research 
undertaken on behalf of the then Policy and Innovation Unit into what additional 
measures or instruments would be needed to enable the targets to be met (Strategy 
Unit, 2002). 
The shift in policy agendas has taken place in the context of significant changes in the 
institutional arrangements. In the post-war era, under the universalist welfare state 
structure of service delivery, municipalities were responsible for all aspects of waste 
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management including collection, disposal and regulation of waste. This began to change 
in the mid-1970s with the privatisation of local authorities’ waste collection services. In 
the 1980s, the neo-liberal agenda extended the process of privatisation by creating 
arms-length local authority waste disposal companies (LAWDC) and the subsequent 
privatisation of waste disposal services in many areas. Since then, market forces have 
played an increasingly influential role in the spatial distribution of disposal sites and the 
patterns of waste movement around the country. Another important change occurred in 
1996 when the formation of a new regulatory framework led to the transfer of the waste 
licensing function of local authorities to the Environment Agency, a centrally appointed 
body. This removed the professional arm of local authorities’ embryonic regional co-
ordinating mechanism, i.e. the networks of local authorities’ waste regulation officers. 
The latest addition to this process of institutional re-configuration was the formation of 
RTABs in the 2000s following publication of the government’s long overdue Planning 
Policy Guidance Note 10 (PPG10) (DETR, 1999). 
 
2. From government to governance  
The institutional changes in waste management and the formation of RTABs in particular 
can be seen as part of a wider process of transition from government to governance 
which, in Britain, was facilitated by the neo-liberal policy agenda of the rolling back of 
state activities, de-regulation / re-regulation, and increased privatisation of service 
deliveries (Thornley, 1993). 
The concept of governance has found a central place in social science debate. Various 
theoretical perspectives have tried to conceptualise the shift from government to 
governance and its outcomes (Pierre, 1999; 2000; Peters, 2000). For example, 
regulation theorists argue that this transition is part of and a response to the wider 
process of socio-economic change manifested in a move away from a Fordist mass 
production system and an established Keynesian welfare state towards post-Fordist 
flexible specialisation (Jessop, 1995a; 1995b; Piore and Sabel, 1984). Jessop (1997) 
argues that central to these developments is the profound restructuring of the state and 
its changing role in governing the relationships between society and economy and hence 
a shift from government to governance. Government in this context refers to the 
dominance of state power organised through the formal public sector agencies and 
bureaucratic procedures. The neat and simple dividing lines within formal, hierarchical 
government relations, however, have been increasingly fading away to be replaced by 
overlapping and complex relationships which have come to be known as governance. 
Healey et al (2002), argue that governance, in its descriptive sense, directs attention to 
the proliferation of agencies, interests, service delivery and regulatory systems which 
are involved in making policies and taking actions. In its normative sense, governance is 
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defined as an alternative model for managing collective affairs. It is seen as “horizontal 
self-organisation among mutually interdependent actors” (Jessop, 2000, page 15), of 
whom government is only one and with only ‘imperfect control’ (Rhodes, 1997, page 8). 
Despite the variations in the definition of governance, there is a degree of agreement 
about the outcome of these restructuring processes which includes: 
• A relative decline in the role of the state in the management of social and economic 
relationships 
• The involvement of non-governmental actors in a range of state functions at a 
variety of spatial scales  
• A change from hierarchical forms of government structures to more flexible forms of 
partnership and networking (Stoker and Young, 1993) 
• A shift from provision by formal government structures to the sharing of 
responsibilities and service provision between the state and civil society  
• The emergence of local and regional forms of governance as a result of mobilisation 
and construction of scale-specific state policies and institutions (Brenner, 2000). 
Whilst the process of transition has led to the expansion of policy making space and 
engagement of a wider range of actors, it has also created a number of ‘side effects’, 
which have become the hallmark of the evolving institutional landscape of waste 
management in the UK in such a way that by the end of the 1990s the overall picture 
was one of: institutional fragmentation; multiplication of agencies and complex webs of 
relationships; breakdown of established networks of waste regulation officers; disparity 
of powers and responsibilities across different tiers and departments of governmental 
and non-governmental bodies; increasing role of market forces in the spatial distribution 
of waste management facilities; and, confusion over ‘who does what’ (see Figure 1). 
In this context, controlling or even steering the complex, fragmented and often 
competing interests is increasingly beyond the capacity of the state as an agent of 
authority. As Rhodes (2000) argues, governments are no longer the key locus for 
integration of urban relationships but merely one of many actors competing for access to 
resources and control of policy agendas. Hence, the challenge of governance is how to 
create new forms of integration out of fragmentation and new forms of coherence out of 
inconsistency. As Stoker points out, governance is “a concern with governing, achieving 
collective action in the realm of public affairs, in conditions where it is not possible to 
rest on recourse to the authority of the state” (Stoker, 2000, page 93). It is about how 
collective actors emerge from a diverse group of interests (Le Gales, 1998). A key 
concern is the availability of strategies of co-ordination to actors involved in the 
governing of a specific policy area such as waste management. The capacity to govern 
depends on “effective co-ordination of interdependent forces within and beyond the 
state” (Jessop, 1997a, page 96). Indeed, the need for, or the rhetoric of, co-ordination 
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underpinned a raft of partnership initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s. Amongst the 
multiple benefits of partnership working, building consensus and capacity, and creating 
synergy are frequently mentioned in the partnership literature (Bailey, 1995; Pierre, 
1998, Balloch and Taylor, 2001).  
 
3. RTABs as a new form of governance?  
In the waste policy area, the introduction of the government’s long overdue PPG10 
(DETR, 1999) which encouraged the Regional Planning Bodies (RPBs) to set up RTABs 
can, therefore, be considered as part of a wider process of re-integration, which in 
Britain was captured under New Labour’s banners of ‘joined-up thinking’, stakeholder 
engagement and regional devolution. PPG10 proposed the establishment of officer-level 
regional groupings which would bring together, on a voluntary basis, the key 
stakeholders in waste management including representatives from local authorities, the 
waste industry, the Environment Agency, regional Government Offices, Regional 
Planning Bodies and other statutory consultees (see Figure 2). Hence, whilst the creation 
of RTABs was partly a response to the issue of regional self-sufficiency and co-ordination 
of the cross-boundary movement of regional waste, it was also a way of widening the 
range of stakeholders involved in the management of waste, co-ordinating their activities 
and averting their potential conflicts. 
However, PPG10’s view of the role of RTABs is a narrow technocratic one, seeing them 
as consultative bodies whose task is to provide specialist and technical advice to the 
RPBs on waste management options. Hence, a PPG10 ‘model’ RTAB would be responsible 
for collecting data, identifying options based on technical assessment of alternatives, 
producing technical reports on the amount of waste produced and managed in the 
region, and monitoring and reviewing these annually. 
In practice, being situated at the heart of the bottom-up and top-down economic, 
social, environmental and political pressures that are shaping strategic waste planning, 
RTABs have much to offer as a new form of governance with a potential to: transcend 
institutional fragmentation; overcome parochial attitudes to waste facility siting; alleviate 
local and regional tensions; foster a regional consensus and collaborative approach; and 
improve the strategic framework for waste planning. 
In addition, the nature of the waste policy sector, i.e. the ‘object’ of governance, 
provides suitable ground upon which a transition to governance may take place. This is 
in contrast to the housing and minerals policy areas which, as Cowell and Murdoch 
(1999) argue, were, by 1999, still dominated by the existence of a ‘dominant strategic 
line’, that had continued to steer the direction of debate, policy and action and prevented 
a move towards governance relations. Such a dominant strategic line imposed by central 
government historically has been absent in the waste policy area. Indeed, there has 
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been a lack of clear government policy on how waste should be managed, or, more 
recently, how the targets for diversion from landfill should be met. Whilst some regional 
and local policy makers and almost the entire waste industry find the absence of strong 
central policy a frustrating situation leading to unreasonable delays in the development 
of waste management facilities, others may consider it as an opportunity that frees up 
space for innovation, and increases the scope for development of governance relations at 
regional and local levels. Therefore, the lack of a nationally imposed ‘dominant strategic 
line’ on waste policy can, potentially, liberate RTABs to develop regionally-embedded 
governance solutions to conflicts over waste management. In the words of one RTAB 
member, “if people are good at what they do… you could use it as a massive 
campaigning tool to push forward a particular agenda” (pers. com., 2002).1 
In this paper, we aim to assess the quality of RTABs’ internal relations in order to 
examine the extent to which they are capable of evolving beyond the PPG10 model in 
such a way that they fulfil their governance potential. Key to this is their capacity to 
create the conditions that would enable them to meet the challenge of governance, i.e. 
to take collective action to improve the strategic framework for waste planning. Our 
focus is on identifying the potential barriers and opportunities for them to make the 
transition. 
 
4. The conceptual framework  
Previously, following the work of Logan and Molotch (1987), the literature, largely from 
the United States, provided a powerful argument about the role of growth coalitions in 
creating the conditions for collective action. However, the narrow focus of this literature 
on economic growth makes it difficult to explore the complex relations around 
sustainable waste management where the interplay of economic, social and 
environmental goals makes governance solutions to conflicts a much more challenging 
task. As one environmental campaigner put it, 
“you have a wide range of interests round the table, and how on earth [do] you 
balance up your commercial interests with your political… community angle, and your 
environmental… and… sustainability interests, etc.” (pers. com., 2002). 
 
To conceptualise these more complex relations, regime theory has provided a wider 
perspective. Following Clarence Stones’ study of urban regime formation in Atlanta 
(Stone, 1993), regime theorists have moved beyond growth coalitions and focused on 
the formation of regimes whose remit is wider than economic growth and can include 
other shared purposes and common goals. From the regime theory perspective, the 
problem of governance, understood as the challenge of collective action, can be resolved 
by forming governing coalitions or regimes that are informal, stable, have access to 
                                                 
1
 All quotations attributed to pers. com. (personal communication) in the text were taken from interviews 
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institutional resources, have a sustained role in decision-making, and draw on actions 
from public and non-public sectors (Stoker, 2000). It is argued that substantive policy 
outcomes can be achieved if organisations from various sectors come to co-operate as a 
result of recognising mutual dependency in objectives, resources, power or knowledge 
(Bryson and Crosby, 1992). For that to happen, however, what matters most is the 
quality of governance relations. Many commentators have tried to identify specific sets 
of factors for assessing such qualities and the performance of governance and its 
capacity to act collectively (see for example, Amin and Thrift, 1995; Coffey and Bailly, 
1996; Malmberg and Maskell, 1997). Similarly, identifying key requirements for effective 
partnership working has found a prominent place in the partnerships literature (see for 
example: Shucksmith, 2000, page 44) Innes et al (1994) in a study of growth 
management through consensus building in California have argued that, “consensus 
building achieves its coordination effects in great part by creating or amplifying three 
types of capital: social, intellectual, and political capital” (page 46). They use the term 
capital as it represents “shared value that can grow as it is used. Once created, this 
capital lives on among participants even after the group disbands, and it facilitates 
future coordination” (1994, pages 46 - 47).  
Similarly, de Magalhaes et al (2002) in their study of an urban regeneration project in 
Newcastle draw on the work of Innes and Booher (1999) on consensus-building 
processes and use the notion of ‘institutional capital’ as a conceptual device for linking 
these three forms of capital. Regime theory also confirms the significance of these 
factors and further highlights a number of other factors which are seen as essential for a 
regime to achieve a sustained capacity to act and influence developments in key policy 
areas (Stoker, 1995, drawing on Stone, 1993). These include: composition of the 
governing coalition, nature of relations among members of the governing coalition, and 
the resources that members bring to the coalition. 
We have consolidated these perspectives and concluded that the following forms of 
capital are central to the success of a self-organised voluntary grouping, such as an 
RTAB, in enhancing its ability to act collectively and in developing its capacity to achieve 
its goals and objectives:  
• Intellectual capital: knowledge resources that are socially constructed and flow 
among the actors 
• Social capital: relational resources and the nature of relations between the actors  
• Material capital: financial and other tangible resources that are made available to the 
actors and the group  
• Political capital: power relations and the capacity to mobilise resources and take 
action 
                                                                                                                                                        
conducted with RTAB members during the course of the research. 
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Creating, sustaining and making use of these capitals depend on a number of factors 
which are elaborated in the remaining parts of this paper where we attempt to 
conceptualise the potential barriers and enablers for RTABs to develop their capacity to 
act as the regional governance for waste management. It is important to note that many 
of the barriers and enablers that have been identified by RTAB members during the 
course of the study are often antitheses, reflecting the dynamic and developmental 
nature of governance formation in different localities and at different times. 
 
5. Quality of governance relations in RTABs 
5.1 Intellectual capital  
This refers to knowledge resources. Knowledge in this context is seen as a non-linear, 
interactive and socially constructed resource. It is not considered as given or fixed, but 
rather as created over time and through a dynamic process of interaction between the 
actors. The key areas for which the development of shared knowledge is crucial are the 
problem definition and the realisation of the mutual interdependency between the actors. 
As argued by de Magalhaes et al (2002), the building up of intellectual capital depends 
on: the range of knowledge available to the actors; frames of reference to turn the 
information into meaningful and integrated knowledge and to make sense of it; free flow 
of knowledge and sharing of information between the actors; and the learning capacity 
of actors, which includes both willingness to learn and openness to new ideas. 
 
The range of knowledge 
Knowledge in this context encompasses all forms of knowledge ranging from technical 
and scientific knowledge, often presented by the experts and professionals, to tacit and 
experiential knowledge that can also be held by non-expert and lay people. As regards 
the former, RTABs are faced with two major constraints. The first one is the lack of 
adequate data and information. Despite major survey work undertaken by the 
Environment Agency and the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to 
provide better statistical information on municipal waste, up-to-date and reliable data for 
various waste streams and in particular industrial and commercial waste is still patchy 
and limited. In the Yorkshire and Humber Region, for example, this led to the exclusion 
of regional policy on industrial and commercial waste, an omission which was heavily 
criticised during the consultation, and which adversely affected the credibility of their 
Regional Waste Strategy.  
The second constraint is the limited expertise in strategic waste planning, due to both 
historical and educational reasons. For several decades until the mid-1990s, the role of 
land use planning in waste management was a marginal one. Determining the location of 
landfill sites was a relatively easy task for planners, as these were often made available 
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through the process of mineral extraction. For a long time, this seemingly beneficial 
association of mineral working and waste disposal, coupled with the general availability 
of ‘technically’ suitable sites for landfill, made the challenge of land allocation through 
the planning process relatively problem-free. As Davoudi (1999) argues, the strongly-
held and persistent discourse of ‘filling holes in the ground’ discouraged the system from 
any attempt to search for other spatial-ordering concepts and limited its task to the 
formulation or indeed reiteration of a series of often standard site-specific regulatory 
criteria. Planning policies for waste, often no more than two or three policies tacked on 
at the back of the development plan, were primarily confined to a set of ‘bad neighbour 
impacts’ criteria to be drawn upon when development control decisions on specific sites 
were to be made. This low profile of waste planning has curtailed the demand and 
enthusiasm for accumulating knowledge and practical planning experience over the past 
decades. Furthermore, there has been little specialist training and education on strategic 
waste planning within the planning curricula. This, along with a wider problem of 
recruitment in planning education has led to a shortage of graduates with specialist 
knowledge in waste planning, as reflected in the following comment by a local 
government official, “the number of people with sufficient knowledge and abilities to do 
this sort of work is fairly small” (pers. com., 2002). 
As regards non-expert knowledge, a key issue is access. This can be provided by 
engaging with or giving voice to multiple stakeholders within the group. Although PPG10 
encouraged the inclusion of a wider range of actors in RTABs, the exact number and 
composition of the RTABs’ membership, particularly the decision on whether to invite 
representatives from environmental and community groups, were left to the discretion of 
the regional planning bodies. As shown in Figure 2, this has resulted in substantial 
variations across the nine RTAB areas (the eight English regions and London), which in 
mid-2002, when all the RTABs were engaged in the development of regional waste 
strategies, ranged from a small, expert-based RTAB with thirteen members in the North 
West to a large, multiple stakeholder-based RTAB with over thirty members in Yorkshire 
and Humber (YH), while only London and YH RTABs had representatives from 
environmental or community groups when they were first established. The decision of 
the YH Assembly to set up a large, open and multiple stakeholder-based Steering Group 
(acting until the beginning of 2004 as the RTAB for the region) provided them with a 
potentially large pool of various types of knowledge to tap into, as reflected in the 
following comment, “we bring local knowledge to the Committee [the sub-groups]… we 
can bring a sort of reality check to whatever is being drawn up” (pers. com., 2002).  
However, it is important to distinguish between having a presence in the group and 
making an effective contribution. As a member of the YH Steering Group indicated, 
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“membership of the RTAB doesn’t necessarily accurately reflect their input/influence… 
Making a serious contribution can be time-consuming” (pers. com., 2003). 
Although gradually most RTABs have allowed representatives from 
environmental/community groups to be included, some, namely the North West, North 
East and East of England, have resisted the trend. These consider such an approach 
unnecessary and likely to cause delays in the decision-making process. A typical view 
among the latter group is, 
“I think their inclusion would have meant that the timescale we took to do what we do 
would have been even longer…. we may not have been able to maintain a consensus, 
and we may have always had a minority report coming out” (pers. com., 2002). 
 
Frames of reference 
As de Magalhaes et al (2002, pages 55 - 56) point out, building knowledge resources 
“depends on the conscious reflection on, and development of, frames of reference, that 
is the underlying conceptions that shape the meanings and interpretations given to the 
flow of knowledge”. RTAB members come from a variety of backgrounds and have 
different interests and life/career experiences. Therefore, universal information has often 
led to multiple interpretations and conclusions in terms of what should be the right 
course of action. This reflects the limited, and in some cases lack of, shared 
understanding among the RTAB members about underlying issues such as the 
conception of ‘sustainable waste management’, as reflected in the following remarks 
from a member of the waste industry and an environmental campaigner respectively,  
“Sustainability means all things to all men. There actually is a fundamental problem 
with this. We have this nebulous concept of what we would like. We would like 
sustainability. What you actually need is an agreed definition of sustainability” (pers. 
com., 2002). 
 
Therefore, “there is no common understanding, because we have people from 
business there, we have politicians and we have NGOs, effectively. So you have views 
right across the spectrum” (pers. com., 2002). 
 
However, one area where a degree of consensus is developing is the need for meeting 
the statutory targets set by the government and the EU Landfill Directive. Targets have 
become the driving force for change. Whilst there are widely different views about what 
constitutes the best management options for meeting the targets, the urgency of 
responding to them has focused people’s minds. Hence, they have provided a potentially 
unifying and shared frame of reference for structuring the debate amongst the 
stakeholders. It could be argued that if the current level of emphasis on targets 
continues, ‘meeting targets’ may well become a ‘dominant strategic line’ through which a 
“strong [European-to]-national-to-local chain of command” (Cowell and Murdoch, 1999, 
page 663) will be established. As is the case for minerals and housing policy areas, this 
may hinder or slow down the development of governance relations within RTABs. 
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Free flow of knowledge and the learning capacity of actors 
The free flow of knowledge among members is critical to the development of collective 
learning and intellectual capital. Drawing on social learning theory, Huberman’s (1993) 
model of ‘sustained interactivity’ emphasises that shared meaning will develop through 
processes of social interaction. These processes can facilitate testing and adapting 
expert-based knowledge in practice through ‘tinkering’, which bonds explicit and tacit 
knowledge and contributes to knowledge creation (Hargreaves, 1999). Within RTABs this 
is hindered by two factors. One is a tendency to withhold knowledge either because of 
political expediency or commercial confidentiality. The other is a tendency to narrow 
down lines of communication with the wider network in a desire to achieve greater 
organisational efficiency and to meet deadlines. In the YH RTAB, for example, 
constructing sub-groups created more efficiency in producing a number of reports to 
feed into the regional waste strategy (RWS), yet it reduced the opportunity for those 
who were not members of the sub-groups to share the reservoir of knowledge and 
experience that was being amassed within the sub-groups. Inevitably, they felt isolated 
and “semi-detached from [the process]” (pers. com., 2002) and consequently made only 
a limited contribution to the learning process. 
A key strength of RTABs and a rich source for the development of intellectual capital 
is the diversity of their memberships, something that had not existed, to this extent, in 
the previous institutional configuration for waste management. The views of most RTAB 
members in this respect was summed up by the remark of one local government official 
that RTABs are “bringing together parties that otherwise wouldn’t have a chance to 
discuss these issues and formulate a way forward” (pers. com., 2002). 
However, tapping into this knowledge resource and mobilising it to make a change 
depends on the capacity and willingness of RTAB members to learn collectively and “to 
learn to talk and listen to one another despite previous rivalries” (Innes et al, 1994). 
However, often, those with a fixed mind-set find it difficult to do so because, 
“there is so much misinformation, misunderstanding ... about waste, about its costs, a 
lot of it is almost folklore. We all have our story to tell about recycling, don’t we? 
There is a whole folklore there, that doesn’t necessarily help us move forward” (pers. 
com., 2002). 
 
Within RTABs, historical rivalries continue to create obstacles in the learning process 
as pointed by one local government employee, 
“I don’t think people share best practice very well. There is certainly a lot of water 
under some of the bridges that create a problem… to do with history of other things” 
(pers. com., 2002). 
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5.2 Social Capital 
Building and sustaining social capital is a major step towards the formation of effective 
coordination and collective action, particularly given the voluntary nature of RTABs. 
Social capital is a crucial part of constructing a shared sense of community that enables 
the participants to respond flexibly and appropriately to complex and multi-layered 
issues such as the management of waste.  
The concept of social capital links to other concepts, notably the concept of ‘civic 
society’, or ‘civic virtues’, terms which were coined by Putnam following his work based 
on a longitudinal study of Italian regional institutions (Putnam, 1993). This study showed 
that civic context matters for the work of institutions. Putnam defined civic virtues as 
encompassing “an active, public-spirited citizenry, by egalitarian political relations, by a 
social fabric of trust and co-operation” (1993, page 15). Using these ideas in the context 
of coalitions and partnerships, it is argued that creating and maintaining co-operation 
depends on setting up relations that are based on: solidarity, trust and reciprocity rather 
than hierarchy and bargaining; mutual support for the actions that have been agreed; 
and a shared sense of purpose and/or mutual interdependency (Stone, 1993; Innes et al 
1994; de Maglahaes et al, 2002)  
 
Solidarity, trust and mutual support  
Within RTABs, there are a number of barriers to the development of trust and mutual 
support. A key problem is the long-standing and deep-rooted political and environmental 
conflicts over the cross-border movement of waste, especially from the exporting 
metropolitan areas to their surrounding shire counties (Davoudi, 2000). In the North 
West Region, for example, over half of Greater Manchester’s landfilled municipal waste 
and about 40% of that from Merseyside was managed in the Mid-Mersey area in 
2000/01 (North West RTAB, 2003, paragraph 14). Similarly, London exports 
approximately 70% of its non-recycled municipal waste for disposal in the landfill sites of 
Essex, Bedfordshire and other adjoining counties (calculated from the data supplied at 
GLA, 2004). 
More generally, a related source of conflict is the siting of major waste facilities 
particularly for managing waste produced outside the administrative boundaries of a 
given area. Those areas with a long history of minerals extraction, i.e. with many ‘holes 
in the ground’, often find themselves as preferred locations for the disposal of waste 
produced in other parts of the region. These incessant flows of waste have turned places 
such as Warrington, in the Mid-Mersey area, into what is often expressed locally as the 
“dustbin of the North West” (pers. com., 2002). Similarly, “East London feels that it has 
been the dustbin of London for long enough and so they are very resistant to the 
establishment of any more waste facilities” (pers. com., 2002).  
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For at least the last ten years, the intra-regional movement of waste has fuelled this 
growing conflict. In many English regions, it has led to calls for greater sub-regional self-
sufficiency, which would obligate major exporting areas to manage their waste within 
their own boundaries. Such pressures, not surprisingly, have been resisted by major 
waste-exporting areas that insist on adopting regional self-sufficiency, and have so far 
been successful in pursuing their line of argument in planning arenas. Greater 
Manchester, for example, is perceived to have “used its financial muscle simply to 
transfer its problems somewhere else” (pers. com., 2002). In most metropolitan areas, 
“the big issue is sub-regional self-sufficiency arguments. People don’t want the Assembly 
to foist facilities on them and say, ‘you must have them there’” (pers. com., 2002). 
Prior to the formation of RTABs, little had been done at the regional level to resolve 
these contested issues. Within the regional planning arenas (such as the Examination in 
Public of Regional Planning Guidance) discussions on waste had been crowded out by 
other priorities such as regional housing and transport policies. Furthermore, constant 
changes to the nature and composition of pre-RTAB regional arrangements had broken 
up the foundations which communities of trust could have been built upon. However, 
despite these pressures some regions had been more successful in maintaining a degree 
of regional grouping than others. This variable quality of pre-RTAB regional working was 
partly the reason for the variable level of enthusiasm for and timing of RTAB formation in 
different regions. In some regions, such as most of those in the North of England and 
the Midlands, RTABs were set up in 1999 or even earlier, while those in the South of 
England were generally established in 2000. The Yorkshire and Humber RTAB was not 
established until mid-2001. As mentioned above, such differences often reflect diverse 
regional histories in terms of the existence and experience of pre-RTAB regional 
networks. The North West and the West Midlands in particular, where the need for co-
ordination and conflict resolution over the intra-regional movement of waste had been 
greater, had operational ‘shadow’ RTABs even prior to the publication of PPG10. This not 
only provided a convenient platform for the formation of RTABs, almost overnight, it also 
endowed them with an established network of people with past ‘successful’ experience of 
working together. In the North West, this is reflected in the fact that attendance in 
meetings is “pretty good…. I think that’s a function of the length of time we’ve worked 
together and the commitment, if you like, to what we’re doing” (pers. com., 2002). 
The significance of lead-in time in the development of trust-based relationships was 
particularly recognised among the members of the youngest RTAB, i.e. the Yorkshire and 
Humber. In the words of one of its members, “it’s quite business-like [now].… As the 
Steering Group [RTAB] members get to know each other better then it becomes more 
cordial” (pers. com., 2002). However, as Pratt et al (1998) argues with respect to 
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partnership, maintaining such relationships resides on the degree of commitments from 
the partners,  
“The first few meetings were fairly full…. [But later there were] nearly as many 
apologies as attendees…. If you feel semi-detached from it, if you feel that… you 
aren’t personally involved directly in some of the work, then it is less of an incentive 
to actually keep to diary dates, or make diary dates available” (pers. com., 2002). 
 
Shared sense of purpose and mutual interdependency 
Stoker and Mossberges (1995) argue that the most common way of achieving co-
operation is by mutual interdependency or a deeply held commitment to a shared social 
purpose. Evidence from the first phase of the research has shown that RTABs’ relations 
are still under-developed in both areas. As regards the former, many RTAB members are 
fully aware of their self-interest, as shown in the following statement by a local authority 
waste management officer,  
“I am here to make sure that things are not put in the regional waste strategy 
that would not be in the interests of the organisation that I represent” (pers. 
com., 2002)  
 
However, they have not yet moved from this parochial position into one which 
acknowledges mutual interdependency between the members. Such a transition partly 
depends on the extent to which RTABs are seen by their members as key arenas where 
conflicts are played out and governance solutions for strategic waste planning are 
sought. As Innes et al (1994) argue, 
“consensus building cannot work effectively if the issues are fought out in multiple 
arenas simultaneously. Players need to believe the consensus process is the place 
where they must bring their concerns” (page xi). 
 
The current institutional architecture for waste, however, is littered with parallel 
decision-making arenas, which if they remain intact will hinder progress on development 
of regional governance relations. RTABs are situated and have to operate within a top-
down hierarchical system of waste management and planning which is functionally 
disjointed at the top and bottom (see Figure 3), produces out of sync plans and 
strategies, follows un-coordinated procedures governed by different rules, and is 
accountable to a plethora of local and central government departments (Davoudi and 
Evans, 2003). The call by the House of Lords European Union Committee (The Ends 
Report, 2003) for a single inter-departmental waste unit in Whitehall is a clear indication 
of the need for co-ordination at the central government level. 
The consequence for RTABs is that prior to the production of the RWS and waste 
policies of the RPGs, significant decisions with long term consequences about the 
amount, type and location of future waste facilities have been made through a multitude 
of mechanisms at the lower level including waste local plans, municipal waste 
management strategies, development control processes and local commitments to long 
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term contracts with waste management operators. The statutory nature of these 
processes (in contrast to the regional ones prior to the introduction of the Planning and 
Compulsory Purchase Act, 2004), and the local accountability associated with some of 
them, has historically legitimised these arenas as the key sites for conflict resolution 
over the management of waste. In this context, while members of RTABs and RPBs 
continue to have a presence in regional fora and ‘keep a watch’ on how policies are 
shaped, they know that the locus of power lies elsewhere. These are the sites where 
mutual interdependencies between the actors are more evident and have more apparent 
leverage, as stated in the following remark, “If you talk to the politicians…. they dismiss 
the regional assembly (RPBs) as being a toothless tiger” (pers. com., 2002). 
Similarly, evidence pointing to a deeply held shared sense of purpose among RTAB 
members, especially about what constitutes their role, has not emerged from the 
research. Put in the context of a ‘PPG10-governance’ continuum, RTABs’ perception of 
their role becomes a determining factor in their capacity to mobilise resources and to 
make a change. As one local government official pointed out, “the biggest conflict was 
about what is our job, what is our role as an RTAB? That was a big debate” (pers. com., 
2002).  
The views expressed in our interviews range widely from those who consider RTABs 
as mere technical advisory bodies to those who assume a broader remit for themselves; 
one which stretches beyond the technical role to include strategic, co-ordinating and 
integrating tasks. The former view is held predominantly among the members of the 
smaller, expert-based RTABs, such as the North West, whilst the latter is mainly found in 
the larger, stakeholder-based RTABs such as Yorkshire and Humber. Those who hold the 
latter view consider RTABs as ‘strategic thinkers’ emphasising that, “you have got to 
step outside the box …and get away from parochialism. You have got to take a much 
wider remit, a much wider view of things” (pers. com., 2002). They see RTABs as 
‘mediators and consensus-seekers’, stating that, their role “is to influence other decision-
makers in the region; it’s to get them on board to help make, to implement the strategy” 
(pers. com., 2002); “helping decisions being made probably through consensus” (pers. 
com., 2002). The counter-view places the emphasis on the technical role of RTABs and 
argues that an RTAB should be “a more scientific body, with the ability to co-opt 
scientific advisors on specialist subjects….” (pers. com., 2002). Overall, there is a degree 
of consensus among RTAB members that, “the RTAB is giving technical advice, but 
increasingly waste is a very political issue” (pers. com., 2002). 
 
5.3 Material capital.  
Assembling and blending resources is a daunting task. Even if a form of co-operation is 
developed, “for a governing coalition to be viable in the long term, it must be able to 
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mobilise resources commensurate with its main policy agenda” (Stone, 1993, page 21). 
This is the ‘iron law’ of governing. In addition to intangible resources that members bring 
to the group such as political popularity and possession of strategic knowledge (Stone, 
1986), there are also tangible resources, such as financial and asset based resources 
that are important for the continuity of governance relations. 
RTABs were established without any dedicated budget, having to rely on the goodwill 
of the organisations to which their members belong, and limited support from the 
regional planning bodies in some cases. The provision of a venue for meetings, for 
example, has often been shared out amongst the constituent organisations, and only 
recently have regional assemblies begun to take on this responsibility, and then only in 
some regions. 
The biggest contribution that member organisations usually make is the time they 
allow their representatives to spend on RTAB business. For most this is of the order of a 
day every two months, though sometimes considerably more. Limited staff time has led 
to an “inability to meet for very long, to do any work because there is too much to do 
back at the ranch” (pers. com., 2002). Many of the RTAB members interviewed referred 
to having to do their RTAB work in their own time, as in the following example from a 
local government planner. “It’s all been done a little bit on a shoestring at the moment. 
And people kind of volunteering, along with their day job really” (pers. com., 2002). This 
applies particularly to the case of RTAB secretaries, and while in a minority of cases such 
as in Yorkshire and Humber the regional assemblies have taken on the responsibility of 
providing a secretariat, in most cases RTABs have had to rely on the goodwill of one of 
its constituent organisations for this resource. 
A lack of financial resources was a particular problem for RTABs when it came to 
working on the development of regional waste strategies. The two regions that were able 
to progress these the furthest in the early stages, the West Midlands and the North 
West, were the two regions with the longest-established RTABs, and much of the 
preliminary work had been done. Moreover, in the case of the North West, they were 
able to benefit from the almost full-time secondment of an Environment Agency officer 
for sixteen months to work on the data aspects of the report, which 
“was a big boon... pull[ing] everything together with heavily using the RTAB members 
as a sounding board and bringing in technical expertise. It’s really pushed the agenda 
on quite a way” (pers. com., 2002). 
 
For the other regions, the time resources needed to do the necessary work was a 
massive stumbling block and gradually each region realised that the work could only be 
done by the employment of consultants, as confirmed in the following quotation from a 
South East RTAB member, “we were getting nowhere until people managed to put 
together some money and employ a consultant to do the work for us” (pers. com., 
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2002). Without a dedicated budget in most cases finding the financial resources needed 
for this presented a major problem, which was solved in different ways in different 
regions. In Yorkshire and Humber, the consultants were funded by the Regional 
Assembly from its regional planning and other budgets. In the North East and East 
Midlands the funding was split equally between the RPB (regional planning body) and the 
DTLR/ODPM. This latter source came from a central government research grant fund first 
identified by the regional government offices. In the case of the East of England, a levy 
of all the constituent local authorities took the place of the regional assembly element, 
while in the South East and South West a combination of these sources was utilised. 
While a lack of sufficient resources has severely restricted the role of RTABs, and 
could still undermine their future as the chosen site of governance for strategic waste 
planning, it is important to note that in general RTABs have been able to mobilise 
existing resources to compensate for the lack of the free flow of a dedicated budget. 
 
5.4 Political capital 
Political capital is about the capacity to mobilise and depends on power relations. Power 
in this context refers to power to act rather than power over the action of others 
(Dyeberg, 1997). Power is seen as a matter of social production rather than social 
control. “The power struggle concerns not control and resistance but gaining and fusing 
a capacity to act – power to, not power over” (Stone, 1989, page 229). However, it is 
clear that in the social relations of governance processes, both forms of power exist and 
remain in tension. This is certainly the case in both the internal and external relations of 
RTABs. We examine the dynamics of RTABs’ internal power relations by focusing on their 
enabling power, their power to act, to build consensus (not unanimity) over the right 
course of action. Action in this context is the making of the regional waste strategy. We 
will then examine RTABs’ external power relations by focusing on their collective power 
to exert influence on the action of others. Action in this context is the implementation of 
the regional waste strategy through the existing planning and regulatory frameworks 
practiced by other players in other governance arenas, notably by local waste planning, 
collection and disposal authorities. 
 
RTABs’ power to act   
Stoker (2000) argues that the move away from a traditional model of hierarchical and 
mainly political power to a system where the power is shared and split between a variety 
of political and non-political stakeholders has led to further diffusion of power with 
multiple characteristics. Given the diverse nature of RTABs’ membership, such diffusion 
is clearly evident. For example, the Regional Planning Bodies, the local authority 
representatives and the Environment Agency represent primarily the command power 
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within the RTAB arena. Their power emerges from their ability to access resources such 
as information (by the Environment Agency), finance and staff time (by the RPB) and 
rules and accountability (by local authorities). The waste industry represents what 
Stoker (2000) calls the systemic power, emerging from their position in the socio-
economic structure. In the case of waste industries, their power emerges from their 
determining role as the key investors and developers of the much-needed infrastructure 
for waste. Finally the environmental and community groups have the power to lobby and 
mobilise effective local campaigns, often around opposition to waste planning 
applications, as reflected in the following remark by a local government official,  
“In some respects the voluntary groups may well have an influence in how these 
things are actually implemented on the ground. Then why not have them represented 
at a regional level as well…. And they’d certainly keep some of the RTAB members on 
their toes” (pers. com., 2002). 
 
The dispersion of power among various actors means that although those with 
systemic and command power may have an advantage in governance relations, they can 
only make use of their position if they turn that power into what Stone (1988) calls ‘pre-
emptive power’, which is the power to act as “a collective actor to guide the community’s 
policy response to social change and alter the terms on which social cooperation takes 
place” (Stone, 1988, page 102). Hence, for example, despite the numerical dominance 
of local authority representatives on RTABs (see Figure 2) they have not been able to 
turn that advantage into pre-emptive power. This is partly because of a lack of shared 
policy agenda among the local authorities due to long-term conflicts over the intra-
regional movement of waste, as mentioned earlier. It is also because of different and 
even conflicting strategies between the representatives of the different parts of a single 
local authority, notably those representing the waste disposal and those representing the 
waste planning divisions. These tensions are often mirrored in the broader regional 
politics. In the North West for example, it is perceived that, 
“the political power within the Assembly (RPB) is with the… conurbation authorities. 
The district shires would see themselves as incredibly distant.... and therefore not 
bothering; don’t feel committed to the region as a whole” (pers. com., 2002). 
 
Building a capacity to govern within this shared power world requires reaching 
agreement among the actors on underlying issues and turning that agreement into 
action. Stone points out that, 
“instead of power to govern being something that can be captured by an electoral 
victory, it is something created by bringing cooperating actors together, not as equal 
claimants, but often as unequal contributors to a shared set of purposes” (Stone, 
1993, page 8). 
 
As we discussed earlier, RTABs are yet to develop a shared understanding of their 
roles and purposes. Furthermore, our research shows that there is still a general 
scepticism among RTABs’ members about the possibility of reaching consensus on waste 
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issues. Some argue, as in the words of one representative of the waste industry, that, 
“there is no such thing as consensus planning for waste management” (pers. com., 
2002). More specifically, there are doubts about the ability of RTABs and/or RPBs to form 
policy preferences for waste management options for their areas. For some members of 
the RTABs this is seen as a formidable task, and they argue that,  
“You are never going to get a bunch of 25 people to say, ‘yes, we agree, thumbs up’. 
You might agree and applaud a wishy washy statement which means anything you 
want it to mean” (pers. com., 2002).  
 
Moreover, when it comes to difficult choices, agreements begin to fade away, as one 
environmental campaigner pointed out,  
“We have just been talking politely to one another up to now. And now we are into 
the whole game of let’s talk facts and figures, let’s talk about tonnages…, about 
potential of waste recycling …, incinerators. So, we will have, I think, some pretty 
diverging views” (pers. com., 2002). 
 
Indeed, making decisions on policy preferences relating to the amount, type and 
general location of regional waste facilities has been considered so difficult and 
contentious that many RTABs (such as in the South East Region) have simply precluded 
them from their regional waste strategy. Reaching consensus has been particularly 
problematic for larger, stakeholder-based RTABs. The YH Region had to break out its 
thirty plus-member Steering Group into four sub-groups to be able to make progress on 
the production of its RWS. Later, following the publication of the draft RWS, a small core 
group of actors were singled out of the Steering Group to act as the RTAB, confirming 
the point raised by Innes et al (1994) that, “inclusiveness can lead to unwieldy, highly 
diverse groups in which deep discussion is difficult” (page xii).  
The smaller, expert-based RTABs such as the North West found it easier to reach 
consensus on preferred scenarios for the future regional waste management options and 
to include these in their Technical Report. However, later they found it much more 
challenging to transfer these options swiftly into an agreed Regional Strategy, when 
wider non-technical stakeholders became engaged in the process. So, while success over 
technical issues can be easily achieved amongst a small group of actors who share a 
similar frame of reference, “there is no guarantee of support in the larger group for 
agreements reached in the small ones” (Innes et al, 1994, page xii). The difficulties of 
progressing the agreed options from the ‘technical’ to the ‘political’ arenas were 
highlighted in a study commissioned by the NW Regional Assembly (Griffin Hill, 2001). 
This suggested that, 
“the RTAB [technical] report represents a lot of hard work but will require significantly 
more hard work to build a strategy that has an influence and a consensus of 
support…. [Moreover,] if progress is to be made… a political and public consensus will 
have to form. This is made more difficult when individual authorities appear to be 
taking very different strategy options” (page 15). 
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The North West RTAB therefore took the opposite approach to YH (see Figure 4). 
Following the publication of their Technical Report, they expanded the range of 
stakeholders involved in the process by setting up a Reference Group to steer the 
preparation of the Regional Waste Strategy, whilst keeping intact the membership of 
their RTAB.  
 
Among the factors which have so far prevented some RTABs from building consensus 
and producing commonly held policy preferences, the most prohibiting one has been the 
existence of what may be called ‘discussion blocks’ related particularly to the debate 
about incineration. Although the discourse of the ‘waste hierarchy’ is now universally 
accepted as a key guiding principle for the management of waste, the debate continues 
to be polarised along the traditional line of recycling versus disposal. Attention, however, 
has now moved away from disposal to landfill towards the use of incineration with 
energy recovery (Davoudi, 2001). At one end of the spectrum are the environmental 
groups, such as Friends of the Earth, who are in favour of a moratorium on new 
incinerators and promotion of a ‘zero waste’ strategy. At the other end are some sections 
of the waste industry that appear to be in favour of the capital-intensive option of 
incineration with energy recovery. In the middle are the local authorities that on the one 
hand are under immense pressure from the EU, via the central government, to meet the 
targets for diversion of biodegradable waste from landfills and hence welcome a 
‘technical-fix’ solution (such as an incinerator), and on the other hand faced with 
increasing public opposition are reluctant to give consent to the development of 
politically sensitive waste facilities (notably incinerators). Contrary to the situation in 
other European countries, EfW incineration in Britain still presents a radical change, as 
does the concept of ‘zero waste’. Radical solutions like these tend to intensify the 
challenges of collective action and create ‘discussion blocks’, as clearly reflected in the 
following comments by two local government representatives.  
“Our modelling led us to the fact that you couldn’t achieve the targets in the longer 
term without some element of energy from waste … There is no reason technically to 
exclude it…  [However], the environmental lobby have a fixed view about… what 
should be BPEO [Best Practical Environmental Option]. And they criticise us for not 
coming to that conclusion” (pers. com., 2002, or emphasis).  
 
On the positive side, despite the fact that people have “come with their own baggage 
and views … there’s a good sense of collaboration, willingness and a certain degree of 
enthusiasm to make it all work” (pers. com., 2002).  
 
RTABs’ power over the action of others 
In order to ‘make it all work’, RTABs should be seen to make change at the local level. 
This depends largely on the extent to which the ideas, policies and strategies generated 
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by RTABs have leverage in the waste policy agendas and practices of local authorities. In 
other words, it depends on the weight given to the RWS and/or waste policies of the 
RPGs in local decision-making processes. This is likely to be a key determinant in the 
future role and the trajectory of governance relations in RTABs, as emphasised by one 
local authority official, “it’s getting groups lower down to follow things through… that is 
going to be the hard bit” (pers. com., 2002). 
We aim to address these issues in the next stage of our research when we explore the 
external relations of RTABs and in particular their links with local authorities. In the 
meantime and based on our current findings, it is possible to speculate that RTABs and 
their work are likely to face conflicting receptions from different local authorities. The 
waste-exporting authorities, often consisting of large metropolitan areas, are likely to 
resist the regional pressures that require a change towards sub-regional self-sufficiency. 
Hence, a RWS with a sub-regionally specific policy focus is unlikely to be welcomed by 
them. A survey of metropolitan local authorities in the North West revealed that, “many 
local authorities (particularly Members) do not want regional planning guidance for waste 
management facilities imposed on them” (Griffin Hill, 2001, page 9). In contrast, the 
waste-importing local authorities, often in the shire counties, would welcome a RWS with 
sub-regionally specific policies that can provide them with a more robust basis for 
challenging the status quo.  
Underlying all this is the perception that, “anything we do with waste is going to cost 
more, so for many local authority Members... there’s no good news in waste” (pers. 
com., 2002). Therefore, both groups of local authorities would hope that by re-scaling 
the decision making process from local to regional arenas, what is inherently a political 
matter could be de-politicised. They are implicitly looking for a legitimate way out of 
having to take ‘unpopular’ decisions about the need for and the location of new waste 
facilities by arguing that, “the need is already identified [by the RTAB] and they [local 
authorities] can go ahead with a knowledge that [the decision] is non-political, a regional 
decision” (pers. com., 2002). However, following Cowell and Murdoch (1994), new 
institutional frameworks such as RTABs “do not necessarily provide a neutral space for 
conflict resolution but rather another site where conflict can take place” (page 667). In 
the words of one local authority planner, “it [waste] is a bloody difficult area to deal 
with, and so those decisions are very hard for politicians to make, wherever they’re 
made” (pers. com., 2002). 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the past two decades the context for strategic waste planning has faced a sea change 
both in terms of its policy agenda and its institutional landscape. The former has been 
captured in an EU-driven move away from total reliance on landfill to more sustainable 
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waste management practices. The latter has been manifested in a constant re-
configuration of powers and responsibilities. These changes have taken place in the 
context of wider processes of transition from more traditional forms of government to 
governance. While this has broadened the range of actors involved in decision-making 
and further diffused the locus of power, it has also led to institutional fragmentation. 
Within the waste policy area, the formation of RTABs in the late 1990s represented the 
latest government attempt to inject a degree of coordination into what had become a 
profoundly disjointed institutional arrangement. 
Despite the limited role assumed for RTABs in PPG 10, given the diversity of their 
membership and the voluntary nature of their cooperation as well as their position within 
the regional planning fora, they appear to have much to offer in terms of transcending 
institutional boundaries and fostering collaboration to improve the strategic framework 
for waste management. In other words, RTABs appear to have the potential to act as the 
regional governance for waste policy. 
In this paper, we have attempted to assess the extent to which RTABs are capable of 
meeting the challenge of collective action and fulfilling their wider governance potential 
by examining the dynamics and quality of governance relations within them. Here, we 
drew on a conceptual framework that places the emphasis on the significance of 
developing and amplifying four forms of capital (intellectual, social, material and 
political) in creating the conditions in which collective action can take place. The 
following account presents the outcome of our overall assessment. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the context within which RTABs are operating is rapidly changing, 
hence our remarks should be considered as tentative rather than definitive conclusions 
about the future of RTABs. 
 
Intellectual capital 
The development of intellectual capital within the strategic waste policy domain has been 
undermined by decades of neglect concerning the significance of more sustainable 
methods of waste management and, consequently, a lack of investment in provision of 
adequate and reliable data and information, expert and specialist education, and 
practice-based experiential knowledge. Confronted with this legacy, RTABs had to utilise 
most of their initial energy and resources in collecting regional data, mainly by drawing 
on external expertise and commissioning consultants, a task that they have fulfilled 
relatively successfully, at least with regard to municipal waste. While the urgency of 
meeting targets, the rise of waste on the political agenda, and the increasing private 
sector interests and investment in this area will help improve the knowledge base, the 
capacity of RTABs to develop common frames of reference and a shared interpretation of 
the flow of knowledge available to them remains uncertain. Knowledge resources can 
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lead to the development of intellectual capital only when they are used to shape the 
underlying conceptions of the actors, which in turn inform their actions. Such 
developments will remain unlikely if RTABs continue to under-utilise their members’ 
diverse forms of knowledge and fail to acknowledge the significance of non-technical 
knowledge in interpreting the principles of sustainable waste management. 
 
Social capital 
Historically, the waste policy area has lacked an established long-term tradition of 
regional working. Discussions on regional waste issues have often been crowded out by 
other regional policy priorities, and constant changes to the configuration of pre-RTAB 
regional groupings have broken up the networks in which communities of trust could 
have flourished. The experience of pre-RTAB regional working varies across the country 
and has been stronger in those regions where conflicts over the intra-regional 
movements of waste have been more intense; typically included regions with large 
metropolitan conurbations. In these regions what could have acted as a platform for 
building up trust-based relations has often been undermined by deep-rooted conflicts 
over the cross-border flows of waste. In regions with limited or an absence of pre-RTAB 
joint regional working, an initial barrier to the development of social capital has been a 
lack of time for the actors to get to know each other and learn how to work together 
effectively. 
In both cases, another inhibiting factor in creating social capital has been members’ 
limited recognition of their mutual interdependency. This is partly due to the existence of 
parallel decision-making arenas in the waste policy field. These are the sites where 
traditionally conflicts have been played out and solutions have been sought, and where 
mutual interdependencies between the actors are more evident and have more leverage. 
A third barrier is the ambiguity concerning the role of RTABs. Some RTAB members see 
themselves as ‘technical’ bodies responsible for producing technical reports, while others 
consider themselves as playing a strategic role in the development of regional waste 
strategy. This lack of a shared sense of purpose has sent confusing signals about the 
utility and purpose of developing social capital within the network. 
 
Material capital 
The absence of ring-fenced financial resources has been a major obstacle for RTABs and 
the realisation of their governance potential. However, the issue of material capital is as 
much about the mobilisation of existing resources as the allocation of new ones. It is 
indeed the former capacity that is key to the development of informal, voluntary-based 
governing relations. This is an area where RTABs have shown a degree of innovation by 
tapping into the resources of not only their constituent member organisations but also a 
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number of regional and central funding opportunities. In some regions they have been 
able to mobilise the resource-rich regional players, such as the Regional Development 
Agencies, to follow up those elements of their strategy (such as market development for 
recyclables) that cannot be implemented through waste planning processes. 
 
Political capital 
The ability of RTABs to develop a capacity to govern in a climate where power is 
increasingly diffused and is exercised in multiple forms depends on the extent to which 
actors transform different forms of power into an enabling power, a power to act. This in 
turn rests upon the degree to which they can reach agreement on the underlying issues 
and form common policy preferences for regional waste management options. So far, 
developing such policy preferences has proved problematic for both larger stakeholder-
based and smaller expert-based RTABs. For the latter, the problem emerged when the 
consensus achieved in the ‘technical’ arena of the RTAB among a small group of like-
minded experts had to be agreed upon in the ‘political’ arena of the RPB where a larger 
and more diverse group of actors became engaged in the process. The key ‘discussion 
blocks’ in building up a wider sense of ownership of a strategy which aims to move 
beyond the rhetoric of the ‘waste hierarchy’ often revolve around, firstly, the issue of ‘to 
have’ or ‘not to have’ incinerators and secondly, the existing (or lack of) details on the 
amount, type and location of waste facilities across the region. 
A final determinant in the trajectory of governance relations in RTABs is the extent to 
which RTABs’ ideas and policies have leverage in other waste policy arenas and 
particularly those that are traditionally considered as the key sites for conflict resolution 
at the local level. Drawing on Giddens’ structure-agency concept, there are three key 
mechanisms through which RTABs can potentially become an effective player in 
transforming waste policies and practices at the local level. These are financial 
incentives, rules and regulations, and ideas and frames of reference (Giddens, 1984). As 
regards financial incentives, RTABs and indeed RPBs are somewhat powerless as 
resources tend to concentrate at the level of central government and get allocated to 
local authorities directly, bypassing the regional level. In terms of regulatory powers, 
RTABs’ only channel of influence is through the RWS and RPG. As both of these have 
been until recently non-statutory their leverage has been limited, particularly because 
they are being produced after policies in local plans have already been adopted and/or 
major contracts with waste operators have already committed the local authorities to 
specific waste management options. 
The issue of out-of-sync plans is likely to be resolved after the next review of RPGs, 
and the regulatory power of the RPBs (and hence RTABs) will be enhanced by the 
 26 
statutory nature of the new Regional Spatial Strategies2. However, the extent to which 
RTABs are capable of improving the strategic framework for waste and transforming 
local practice will depend as much on their ability to generate widely acceptable ideas 
and frames of reference as on their newly boosted regulatory powers. It is through the 
power of new concepts and ideas that RTABs have the greatest potential to make a 
difference. However, to be effective RTABs as collective actors need to develop and 
promote a coherent and integrated regional policy preference rather than a sum of 
disparate local / sub-regional policy compromises. They need to develop a shared 
conception of regional space for which problems are identified and solutions sought, 
even if such solutions involve, as they almost always do, making difficult and unpopular 
decisions. Given the current pre-occupation of the RPBs’ local authority representatives 
with the interests and concerns of their local constituencies, for RTABs “to get their 
members to think as a region is one of the hardest things to do” (pers. com., 2002). 
Furthermore, the ability of RTABs themselves to collectively develop and promote such 
an agenda will remain questionable as long as their members continue to be ambivalent 
about their position and role in the making of regional waste strategies. 
 
Future of RTABs? 
Despite their limitations, RTABs represent a new institutional arrangement for strategic 
waste planning with the potential to transform modes of practice in the management of 
waste at the regional level. Their formation can be seen as a ‘specific episode of 
experience’ (Healey, 2003), which has brought together a diverse range of actors whose 
working practices are governed by new, and sometime innovative, processes and 
principles. However, such an episode of innovation will only be sustained and effective in 
transforming routine practices if it is capable of breaking through the wider processes 
that govern the management of waste and re-framing the cultural assumptions about 
legitimacy and accountability (op cit). 
RTABs’ experiences so far have shown little signs of progress in that direction. 
Indeed, the reverse seems to be happening in the sense that the structuring forces of 
formal systems of government are forcing RTABs to adapt their partnership styles and 
working practices to fit into the hierarchical procedures of regional planning arenas. Even 
those RTABs that were initially established with a wide range of stakeholders and a 
broad strategic agenda have, in reaction to these forces, gradually retreated to the 
PPG10 model by carving a core group of ‘experts’ out of the original ‘steering’ group to 
act as the future RTAB for the region. 
As regards the waste policy preferences, attempts to ‘upscale’ the horizons of 
individual local authorities to see the wider regional issues have been confronted by the 
                                                 
2 Following the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act, 2004 
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local politics within the regional planning bodies and particularly the resistance of the 
waste-exporting metropolitan areas to change. Similarly, little has been achieved in the 
form of providing an effective strategic planning framework that clearly guides the 
amount and type of future waste facilities across the region and the broad location of 
regionally significant facilities. In practice, difficult choices have often been postponed to 
the traditional local planning ‘battlefields’. 
Overall, RTABs’ experience show that while the transformation from government to 
governance has created moments of opportunities for actors and networks in various 
policy communities to experience new and sometimes innovative governance relations, 
the survival of these ‘episodes of experiences’ and their paths to institutionalisation have 
remained uncertain and highly vulnerable to the structuring forces of traditional systems 
of government. 
Our reading of the signals that were coming out of the first phase of our research led 
us to conclude that the most likely future scenario for RTABs would be one which would 
strongly resemble the ‘tried and tested’ model of the RAWPs (Regional Aggregates 
Working Parties). These are ‘specialist’ bodies that for the last thirty years have provided 
‘technical’ advice on the aggregates supply and demand trends in the regions, albeit 
within highly prescriptive guidelines that cascade down from central government. 
Comprised mainly of the regulators and regulated, RAWPs are perceived as ‘technical’ 
bodies, immune from political processes. As such, they have been seen as an ‘ideal’ 
model for the future of RTABs. However, in our view, drawing a dividing line between 
what is ‘technical’ and what is ‘political’ in the highly complex and tightly interwoven 
landscape of waste policy will only serve to confuse the actors and reduce their capacity 
to act collectively in seeking new solutions for the more sustainable management of 
waste. This would be particularly damaging at a time when the supply of sites for a full 
range of waste management facilities is becoming the touchstone of effective waste 
strategy-making in the new and arguably more powerful institutions of regional planning. 
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Authority Responsible 
Body 
Main Responsibilities 
 
Plans/documents 
produced 
Nationally 
accountable 
to 
Waste 
Collection 
Authority  
(WCA) 
District Councils 
Unitary Authorities 
London Boroughs 
• Collection of municipal waste  
• Recycling 
Statutory Waste 
Recycling Plans 
DEFRA 
Waste Disposal 
Authority 
(WDA) 
County Councils 
Unitary Authorities 
Joint Waste 
Disposal 
Authorities (where 
they exist)  
• Arrangement for disposal of 
waste collected by WCA either 
through private companies or 
arms-length Local Authority 
Waste Disposal Company 
• Recycling for Civic Amenity 
Sites 
Non-statutory 
Municipal Waste 
Strategies 
DEFRA 
Waste Planning 
Authority 
(WPA) 
County Councils 
Unitary Authorities 
London Boroughs 
• Waste planning policies 
• Determination of waste 
planning applications 
Waste local 
development 
frameworks / waste 
policies of the 
Unitary Development 
Plans 
ODPM 
Waste 
Regulation 
Authority 
(WRA) 
Environment 
Agency (EA) 
• Pollution regulation and waste 
management licensing 
• Provision of information 
• Advising the SoS on national 
waste strategy 
Strategic Waste 
Management 
Assessment for each 
region 
DEFRA 
 
Regional Waste 
Planning 
Authority 
(WRPA) 
Regional Planning 
Body (RPB) 
• Regional spatial planning policy 
• Regional waste management 
policy 
Non-statutory 
Regional Waste 
Strategies / waste 
policies of RSS 
ODPM 
 Regional Technical 
Advisory Body 
(RTAB) 
• Assembling data 
• Providing technical advice on 
waste issues 
Input into Regional 
Waste Strategies / 
waste policies of RSS 
ODPM 
 
 
 
 
 31 
Figure 2: Number and composition of RTAB members, as of 2002 
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Figure 3: Institutional relationships and policy outputs for waste 
National ODPM 
 
 
PPG10 
 DEFRA 
 
National Waste 
Strategy 
 
     
Regional RPB/RTAB 
 
 
RPG/RWS 
   
     
Local WPA 
 
 
WLP/UDP 
 WDA 
 
 
MWS 
 
     
 Responsible authority   
 Policy output    
 
 
 
Figure 4: Alternative models for RTABs 
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